Secrets management

OpenClaw supports additive SecretRefs so supported credentials do not need to live as plaintext in configuration.

Plaintext still works. SecretRefs are opt-in per credential.

Plaintext credentials remain agent-readable if they sit in files the agent can inspect, including openclaw.json, auth-profiles.json, .env, or generated agents/*/agent/models.json files. SecretRefs only reduce that local blast radius once every supported credential is migrated and openclaw secrets audit --check reports no plaintext residue.

Runtime model

Secrets resolve into an in-memory runtime snapshot, eagerly during activation, not lazily on request paths.
Startup fails fast when an effectively active SecretRef cannot be resolved.
Reload is an atomic swap: full success, or keep the last-known-good snapshot.
Policy violations (for example an OAuth-mode auth profile combined with SecretRef input) fail activation before the runtime swap.
Runtime requests read only the active in-memory snapshot. Outbound delivery paths (Discord reply/thread delivery, Telegram action sends) also read that snapshot and do not re-resolve refs per send.

This keeps secret-provider outages off hot request paths.

Agent-access boundary

SecretRefs stop credentials from being persisted in config and generated model files, but they are not a process-isolation boundary. A plaintext credential left on disk in a path the agent can read is still readable via file or shell tools, bypassing API-level redaction. For production deployments where agent-accessible files are in scope, treat migration as complete only when all of these hold:

Supported credentials use SecretRefs instead of plaintext values.
Legacy plaintext residue is scrubbed from openclaw.json, auth-profiles.json, .env, and generated models.json files.
openclaw secrets audit --check is clean after migration.
Any remaining unsupported or rotating credentials are protected by OS isolation, container isolation, or an external credential proxy.

This is why the audit/configure/apply workflow is a security migration gate, not just a convenience helper.

SecretRefs do not make arbitrary readable files safe. Backups, copied configs, old generated model catalogs, and unsupported credential classes stay production secrets until deleted, moved outside the agent trust boundary, or isolated separately.

Active-surface filtering

SecretRefs are validated only on effectively active surfaces:

Enabled surfaces: unresolved refs block startup/reload.
Inactive surfaces: unresolved refs do not block startup/reload; they emit a non-fatal SECRETS_REF_IGNORED_INACTIVE_SURFACE diagnostic.

Examples of inactive surfaces

Disabled channel/account entries.
Top-level channel credentials that no enabled account inherits.
Disabled tool/feature surfaces.
Web search provider-specific keys not selected by tools.web.search.provider. In auto mode (provider unset), keys are consulted by precedence for auto-detection until one resolves; after selection, non-selected provider keys are inactive.
Sandbox SSH auth material (agents.defaults.sandbox.ssh.identityData, certificateData, knownHostsData, plus per-agent overrides) is active only when the effective sandbox backend is ssh and sandbox mode is not off, for the default agent or an enabled agent.
gateway.remote.token / gateway.remote.password SecretRefs are active if any of these hold:
- gateway.mode=remote
- gateway.remote.url is configured
- gateway.tailscale.mode is serve or funnel
- In local mode without those remote surfaces: gateway.remote.token is active when token auth can win and no env/auth token is configured; gateway.remote.password is active only when password auth can win and no env/auth password is configured.
gateway.auth.token SecretRef is inactive for startup auth resolution when OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN is set, because env token input wins for that runtime.

Gateway auth surface diagnostics

When a SecretRef is set on gateway.auth.token, gateway.auth.password, gateway.remote.token, or gateway.remote.password, gateway startup/reload logs the surface state under code SECRETS_GATEWAY_AUTH_SURFACE:

active: the SecretRef is part of the effective auth surface and must resolve.
inactive: another auth surface wins, or remote auth is disabled/not active.

The log entry includes the reason the active-surface policy used.

Onboarding reference preflight

In interactive onboarding, choosing SecretRef storage runs preflight validation before saving:

Env refs: validates the env var name and confirms a non-empty value is visible during setup.
Provider refs (file or exec): validates provider selection, resolves id, and checks the resolved value type.
Quickstart flow: when gateway.auth.token is already a SecretRef, onboarding resolves it before probe/dashboard bootstrap (for env, file, and exec refs) using the same fail-fast gate.

Validation failure shows the error and lets you retry.

SecretRef contract

One object shape everywhere:

{ source: "env" | "file" | "exec", provider: "default", id: "..." }

env
file
exec

{ source: "env", provider: "default", id: "OPENAI_API_KEY" }

Shorthand strings are also accepted on SecretInput fields:

"${OPENAI_API_KEY}"
"$OPENAI_API_KEY"

Validation:

provider must match ^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$
id must match ^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{0,127}$

{ source: "file", provider: "filemain", id: "/providers/openai/apiKey" }

Validation:

provider must match ^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$
id must be an absolute JSON pointer (/...), or the literal value for singleValue providers
RFC 6901 escaping in segments: ~ becomes ~0, / becomes ~1

{ source: "exec", provider: "vault", id: "providers/openai/apiKey#value" }

Validation:

provider must match ^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$
id must match ^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/#-]{0,255}$ (supports selectors such as secret#json_key)
id must not contain . or .. as slash-delimited path segments (for example a/../b is rejected)

Provider config

Define providers under secrets.providers:

{
  secrets: {
    providers: {
      default: { source: "env" },
      filemain: {
        source: "file",
        path: "~/.openclaw/secrets.json",
        mode: "json", // or "singleValue"
      },
      vault: {
        source: "exec",
        command: "/usr/local/bin/openclaw-vault-resolver",
        args: ["--profile", "prod"],
        passEnv: ["PATH", "VAULT_ADDR"],
        jsonOnly: true,
      },
      "team-secrets": {
        source: "exec",
        pluginIntegration: {
          pluginId: "acme-secrets",
          integrationId: "secret-store",
        },
      },
    },
    defaults: {
      env: "default",
      file: "filemain",
      exec: "vault",
    },
    resolution: {
      maxProviderConcurrency: 4,
      maxRefsPerProvider: 512,
      maxBatchBytes: 262144,
    },
  },
}

Env provider

Optional exact-name allowlist via allowlist.
Missing or empty env values fail resolution.

File provider

Reads the local file at path.
mode: "json" (default) expects a JSON object payload and resolves id as a JSON pointer.
mode: "singleValue" expects ref id "value" and returns the raw file contents (trailing newline stripped).
Path must pass ownership/permission checks; timeoutMs (default 5000) and maxBytes (default 1 MiB) bound the read.
Windows fail-closed: if ACL verification is unavailable for the path, resolution fails. For trusted paths only, set allowInsecurePath: true on that provider to bypass the check.

Exec provider

Runs the configured absolute binary path directly, no shell.
By default command must be a regular file, not a symlink. Set allowSymlinkCommand: true to allow symlink command paths (for example Homebrew shims), and pair it with trustedDirs (for example ["/opt/homebrew"]) so only package-manager paths qualify.
Supports timeoutMs (default 5000), noOutputTimeoutMs (default equals timeoutMs), maxOutputBytes (default 1 MiB), env/passEnv allowlist, and trustedDirs.
jsonOnly defaults to true. With jsonOnly: false and a single requested id, plain non-JSON stdout is accepted as that id’s value.
Windows fail-closed: if ACL verification is unavailable for the command path, resolution fails. For trusted paths only, set allowInsecurePath: true on that provider to bypass the check.
Plugin-managed exec providers can use pluginIntegration instead of a copied command/args. OpenClaw resolves the current command details from the installed plugin manifest during startup/reload; if the plugin is disabled, removed, untrusted, or no longer declares the integration, active SecretRefs on that provider fail closed.

Request payload (stdin):

{ "protocolVersion": 1, "provider": "vault", "ids": ["providers/openai/apiKey"] }

Response payload (stdout):

{ "protocolVersion": 1, "values": { "providers/openai/apiKey": "<openai-api-key>" } } // pragma: allowlist secret

Optional per-id errors:

{
  "protocolVersion": 1,
  "values": {},
  "errors": { "providers/openai/apiKey": { "message": "not found" } }
}

File-backed API keys

Do not put file:... strings in the config env block. That block is literal and non-overriding, so file:... is never resolved there. Use a file SecretRef on a supported credential field instead:

{
  secrets: {
    providers: {
      xai_key_file: {
        source: "file",
        path: "~/.openclaw/secrets/xai-api-key.txt",
        mode: "singleValue",
      },
    },
  },
  models: {
    providers: {
      xai: {
        apiKey: { source: "file", provider: "xai_key_file", id: "value" },
      },
    },
  },
}

For mode: "singleValue", the SecretRef id is "value". For mode: "json", use an absolute JSON pointer such as "/providers/xai/apiKey". See SecretRef Credential Surface for the fields that accept SecretRefs.

Exec integration examples

1Password CLI

{
  secrets: {
    providers: {
      onepassword_openai: {
        source: "exec",
        command: "/opt/homebrew/bin/op",
        allowSymlinkCommand: true, // required for Homebrew symlinked binaries
        trustedDirs: ["/opt/homebrew"],
        args: ["read", "op://Personal/OpenClaw QA API Key/password"],
        passEnv: ["HOME"],
        jsonOnly: false,
      },
    },
  },
  models: {
    providers: {
      openai: {
        baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
        models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
        apiKey: { source: "exec", provider: "onepassword_openai", id: "value" },
      },
    },
  },
}

Bitwarden Secrets Manager (`bws`)

Use a resolver wrapper to map SecretRef ids to Bitwarden Secrets Manager item keys. The repository includes scripts/secrets/openclaw-bws-resolver.mjs; install or copy it to an absolute trusted path on the host that runs the Gateway.Requirements:

Bitwarden Secrets Manager CLI (bws) installed on the Gateway host.
BWS_ACCESS_TOKEN available to the Gateway service.
PATH passed to the resolver, or BWS_BIN set to the absolute bws binary path.
BWS_SERVER_URL set in the environment when using a self-hosted Bitwarden instance.

{
  secrets: {
    providers: {
      bws: {
        source: "exec",
        command: "/usr/local/bin/openclaw-bws-resolver.mjs",
        passEnv: ["BWS_ACCESS_TOKEN", "BWS_SERVER_URL", "PATH", "BWS_BIN"],
        jsonOnly: true,
      },
    },
  },
  models: {
    providers: {
      openai: {
        baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
        models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
        apiKey: {
          source: "exec",
          provider: "bws",
          id: "openclaw/providers/openai/apiKey",
        },
      },
    },
  },
}

The resolver batches requested ids, runs bws secret list, and returns values for matching secret key fields. Use keys that satisfy the exec SecretRef id contract, such as openclaw/providers/openai/apiKey; env-var-style keys with underscores are rejected before the resolver runs. If more than one visible Bitwarden secret shares the requested key, the resolver fails that id as ambiguous instead of guessing. After updating config, verify the resolver path:

openclaw secrets audit --allow-exec

HashiCorp Vault CLI

{
  secrets: {
    providers: {
      vault_openai: {
        source: "exec",
        command: "/opt/homebrew/bin/vault",
        allowSymlinkCommand: true, // required for Homebrew symlinked binaries
        trustedDirs: ["/opt/homebrew"],
        args: ["kv", "get", "-field=OPENAI_API_KEY", "secret/openclaw"],
        passEnv: ["VAULT_ADDR", "VAULT_TOKEN"],
        jsonOnly: false,
      },
    },
  },
  models: {
    providers: {
      openai: {
        baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
        models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
        apiKey: { source: "exec", provider: "vault_openai", id: "value" },
      },
    },
  },
}

password-store (`pass`)

Use a small resolver wrapper to map SecretRef ids directly to pass entries. Save this as an executable at an absolute path that passes your exec-provider path checks, for example /usr/local/bin/openclaw-pass-resolver. The #!/usr/bin/env node shebang resolves node from the resolver process PATH, so include PATH in passEnv. If pass is not on that PATH, set PASS_BIN in the parent environment and include it in passEnv too:

#!/usr/bin/env node
const { spawnSync } = require("node:child_process");

let stdin = "";
process.stdin.setEncoding("utf8");
process.stdin.on("data", (chunk) => {
  stdin += chunk;
});
process.stdin.on("error", (err) => {
  process.stderr.write(`${err.message}\n`);
  process.exit(1);
});
process.stdin.on("end", () => {
  let request;
  try {
    request = JSON.parse(stdin || "{}");
  } catch (err) {
    process.stderr.write(`Failed to parse request: ${err.message}\n`);
    process.exit(1);
  }

  const passBin = process.env.PASS_BIN || "pass";
  const values = {};
  const errors = {};

  for (const id of request.ids ?? []) {
    const result = spawnSync(passBin, ["show", id], { encoding: "utf8" });
    if (result.status === 0) {
      values[id] = result.stdout.split(/\r?\n/, 1)[0] ?? "";
    } else {
      errors[id] = { message: (result.stderr || `pass exited ${result.status}`).trim() };
    }
  }

  process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ protocolVersion: 1, values, errors }));
});

Then configure the exec provider and point apiKey at the pass entry path:

{
  secrets: {
    providers: {
      pass_store: {
        source: "exec",
        command: "/usr/local/bin/openclaw-pass-resolver",
        passEnv: ["PATH", "HOME", "GNUPGHOME", "GPG_TTY", "PASSWORD_STORE_DIR", "PASS_BIN"],
        jsonOnly: true,
      },
    },
  },
  models: {
    providers: {
      openai: {
        baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
        models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
        apiKey: {
          source: "exec",
          provider: "pass_store",
          id: "openclaw/providers/openai/apiKey",
        },
      },
    },
  },
}

Keep the secret on the first line of the pass entry, or customize the wrapper to return the full pass show output instead. After updating config, verify both the static audit and the exec resolver path:

openclaw secrets audit --check
openclaw secrets audit --allow-exec

sops

{
  secrets: {
    providers: {
      sops_openai: {
        source: "exec",
        command: "/opt/homebrew/bin/sops",
        allowSymlinkCommand: true, // required for Homebrew symlinked binaries
        trustedDirs: ["/opt/homebrew"],
        args: ["-d", "--extract", '["providers"]["openai"]["apiKey"]', "/path/to/secrets.enc.json"],
        passEnv: ["SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE"],
        jsonOnly: false,
      },
    },
  },
  models: {
    providers: {
      openai: {
        baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
        models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
        apiKey: { source: "exec", provider: "sops_openai", id: "value" },
      },
    },
  },
}

MCP server environment variables

MCP server env vars configured via plugins.entries.acpx.config.mcpServers accept SecretInput, keeping API keys and tokens out of plaintext config:

{
  plugins: {
    entries: {
      acpx: {
        enabled: true,
        config: {
          mcpServers: {
            github: {
              command: "npx",
              args: ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],
              env: {
                GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN: {
                  source: "env",
                  provider: "default",
                  id: "MCP_GITHUB_PAT",
                },
              },
            },
          },
        },
      },
    },
  },
}

Plaintext string values still work. Env-template refs like ${MCP_SERVER_API_KEY} and SecretRef objects resolve during gateway activation, before the MCP server process spawns. As with other SecretRef surfaces, unresolved refs only block activation when the acpx plugin is effectively active.

Sandbox SSH auth material

The core ssh sandbox backend also supports SecretRefs for SSH auth material:

{
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      sandbox: {
        mode: "all",
        backend: "ssh",
        ssh: {
          target: "user@gateway-host:22",
          identityData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_IDENTITY" },
          certificateData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_CERTIFICATE" },
          knownHostsData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS" },
        },
      },
    },
  },
}

Runtime behavior:

OpenClaw resolves these refs during sandbox activation, not lazily on each SSH call.
Resolved values are written to a temp directory with restrictive file permissions (0o600) and used in the generated SSH config.
If the effective sandbox backend is not ssh (or sandbox mode is off), these refs stay inactive and do not block startup.

Supported credential surface

Canonical supported and unsupported credentials are listed in SecretRef Credential Surface.

Runtime-minted or rotating credentials and OAuth refresh material are intentionally excluded from read-only SecretRef resolution.

Required behavior and precedence

Field without a ref: unchanged.
Field with a ref: required on active surfaces during activation.
If both plaintext and ref are present, the ref takes precedence on supported precedence paths.
The redaction sentinel __OPENCLAW_REDACTED__ is reserved for internal config redaction/restore and is rejected as literal submitted config data.

Warning and audit signals:

SECRETS_REF_OVERRIDES_PLAINTEXT (runtime warning)
REF_SHADOWED (audit finding when auth-profiles.json credentials take precedence over openclaw.json refs)

Google Chat compatibility: serviceAccountRef takes precedence over plaintext serviceAccount; the plaintext value is ignored once the sibling ref is set.

Activation triggers

Secret activation runs on:

Startup (preflight plus final activation)
Config reload hot-apply path
Config reload restart-check path
Manual reload via secrets.reload
Gateway config write RPC preflight (config.set / config.apply / config.patch), checking active-surface SecretRef resolvability within the submitted config payload before persisting edits

Activation contract:

Success swaps the snapshot atomically.
Startup failure aborts gateway startup.
Runtime reload failure keeps the last-known-good snapshot.
Write-RPC preflight failure rejects the submitted config; both disk config and the active runtime snapshot stay unchanged.
Providing an explicit per-call channel token to an outbound helper/tool call does not trigger SecretRef activation; activation points remain startup, reload, and explicit secrets.reload.

Degraded and recovered signals

When reload-time activation fails after a healthy state, OpenClaw enters degraded secrets state, emitting one-shot system events and log codes:

SECRETS_RELOADER_DEGRADED
SECRETS_RELOADER_RECOVERED

Behavior:

Degraded: runtime keeps the last-known-good snapshot.
Recovered: emitted once after the next successful activation.
Repeated failures while already degraded log warnings but do not re-emit the event.
Startup fail-fast never emits a degraded event, because runtime never became active.

Command-path resolution

Command paths can opt into supported SecretRef resolution via a gateway snapshot RPC. Two broad behaviors apply:

Strict command paths
Read-only command paths

For example openclaw memory remote-memory paths and openclaw qr --remote when it needs remote shared-secret refs. They read from the active snapshot and fail fast when a required SecretRef is unavailable.

For example openclaw status, openclaw status --all, openclaw channels status, openclaw channels resolve, openclaw security audit, and read-only doctor/config repair flows. They also prefer the active snapshot, but degrade instead of aborting when a targeted SecretRef is unavailable.Read-only behavior:

When the gateway is running, these commands read from the active snapshot first.
If gateway resolution is incomplete or the gateway is unavailable, they attempt a targeted local fallback for that command surface.
If a targeted SecretRef is still unavailable, the command continues with degraded read-only output and an explicit diagnostic that the ref is configured but unavailable in this command path.
This degraded behavior is command-local only; it does not weaken runtime startup, reload, or send/auth paths.

Other notes:

Snapshot refresh after backend secret rotation is handled by openclaw secrets reload.
Gateway RPC method used by these command paths: secrets.resolve.

Audit and configure workflow

Default operator flow:

Audit current state

openclaw secrets audit --check

Configure and apply SecretRefs

openclaw secrets configure --apply

Re-audit

openclaw secrets audit --check

Do not treat the migration as complete until the re-audit is clean. If the audit still reports plaintext values at rest, the agent-access risk remains even when runtime APIs return redacted values. If you save a plan instead of applying during configure, apply that saved plan with openclaw secrets apply --from <plan-path> before the re-audit.

secrets audit

Findings include:

Plaintext values at rest (openclaw.json, auth-profiles.json, .env, and generated agents/*/agent/models.json).
Plaintext sensitive provider header residues in generated models.json entries.
Unresolved refs.
Precedence shadowing (auth-profiles.json taking priority over openclaw.json refs).
Legacy residues (auth.json, OAuth reminders).

Exec note: by default, audit skips exec SecretRef resolvability checks to avoid command side effects. Use openclaw secrets audit --allow-exec to execute exec providers during audit.Header residue note: sensitive provider header detection is name-heuristic based (common auth/credential header names and fragments such as authorization, x-api-key, token, secret, password, and credential).

secrets configure

Interactive helper that:

Configures secrets.providers first (env/file/exec, add/edit/remove).
Lets you select supported secret-bearing fields in openclaw.json plus auth-profiles.json for one agent scope.
Can create a new auth-profiles.json mapping directly in the target picker.
Captures SecretRef details (source, provider, id).
Runs preflight resolution and can apply immediately.

Exec note: preflight skips exec SecretRef checks unless --allow-exec is set. If you apply directly from configure --apply and the plan includes exec refs/providers, keep --allow-exec set for the apply step too.Helpful modes:

openclaw secrets configure --providers-only
openclaw secrets configure --skip-provider-setup
openclaw secrets configure --agent <id>

configure apply defaults:

Scrub matching static credentials from auth-profiles.json for targeted providers.
Scrub legacy static api_key entries from auth.json.
Scrub matching known secret lines from <config-dir>/.env.

secrets apply

Apply a saved plan:

openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json
openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json --allow-exec
openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json --dry-run
openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json --dry-run --allow-exec

Exec note: dry-run skips exec checks unless --allow-exec is set; write mode rejects plans containing exec SecretRefs/providers unless --allow-exec is set.For strict target/path contract details and exact rejection rules, see Secrets Apply Plan Contract.

One-way safety policy

OpenClaw intentionally does not write rollback backups containing historical plaintext secret values.

Safety model:

Preflight must succeed before write mode.
Runtime activation is validated before commit.
Apply updates files using atomic file replacement and best-effort restore on failure.

Legacy auth compatibility notes

For static credentials, runtime no longer depends on plaintext legacy auth storage.

Runtime credential source is the resolved in-memory snapshot.
Legacy static api_key entries are scrubbed when discovered.
OAuth-related compatibility behavior remains separate.

Web UI note

Some SecretInput unions are easier to configure in raw editor mode than in form mode.

Authentication - auth setup
CLI: secrets - CLI commands
Environment Variables - environment precedence
SecretRef Credential Surface - credential surface
Secrets Apply Plan Contract - plan contract details
Security - security posture

​Runtime model

​Agent-access boundary

​Active-surface filtering

​Gateway auth surface diagnostics

​Onboarding reference preflight

​SecretRef contract

​Provider config

​File-backed API keys

​Exec integration examples

​MCP server environment variables

​Sandbox SSH auth material

​Supported credential surface

​Required behavior and precedence

​Activation triggers

​Degraded and recovered signals

​Command-path resolution

​Audit and configure workflow

​One-way safety policy

​Legacy auth compatibility notes

​Web UI note

​Related

Runtime model

Agent-access boundary

Active-surface filtering

Gateway auth surface diagnostics

Onboarding reference preflight

SecretRef contract

Provider config

File-backed API keys

Exec integration examples

MCP server environment variables

Sandbox SSH auth material

Supported credential surface

Required behavior and precedence

Activation triggers

Degraded and recovered signals

Command-path resolution

Audit and configure workflow

One-way safety policy

Legacy auth compatibility notes

Web UI note

Related