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The bundled beam plugin receives a sanitized coding-session snapshot over authenticated HTTP and presents it in the Control UI’s existing external-session catalog. The source computer sends text out; OpenClaw never connects back to that computer and receives no filesystem, terminal, tool, or node capability. Beam ships with OpenClaw but is disabled by default. When enabled, it registers:
  • POST /api/v1/beam/sessions
  • the read-only Beam session catalog in the Control UI sidebar

Enable

Equivalent config:
Disable the plugin when the ingest route is not needed:

Authentication

The receiver uses normal Gateway HTTP authentication. It is not an anonymous upload endpoint.
  • With gateway.auth.mode: "trusted-proxy", send requests through the configured identity-aware proxy. Beam relies on Gateway authentication but does not persist proxy identity headers as uploader attribution.
  • With token or password auth, send Authorization: Bearer <gateway-token-or-password>.
  • Do not enable Beam with gateway.auth.mode: "none" unless another private ingress fully authenticates every request.
A Cloudflare Access-protected deployment can authenticate a local CLI without exposing a GitHub token:
The beam skill in openclaw/agent-skills handles local transcript discovery, redaction, Cloudflare Access login, and upload for Claude Code and Codex.

Request

The schema is closed. Beam rejects unknown fields, invalid item types, empty text, more than 200 items, item text over 6,000 characters, non-JSON requests, and bodies over 56 KiB. A successful upload returns the stable Beam id and a relative Control UI URL:
Uploading the same beamId updates the existing catalog row. A completed upload sets the row status to completed; earlier updates display as live.

Storage and visibility

Beam stores sanitized payloads in OpenClaw’s shared SQLite-backed plugin state:
  • at most 500 sessions
  • seven-day retention refreshed by each update
  • oldest-entry eviction when the catalog reaches its bound
  • server receipt time controls catalog ordering; clients cannot move themselves ahead with a forged timestamp
The catalog is intentionally shared across the Gateway operator domain. Every client with operator.read can view every beamed session, while uploads require operator.write or operator.admin. Uploader identity is not retained, and any write-authorized operator that knows a Beam id can update that row. OpenClaw operator scopes are not tenant isolation; use a separate Gateway when sessions must be isolated between teams or machines.

Security boundary

Beam is passive session publication, not remote control.
  • It has no continueSession, archive, terminal, tool, or node capability.
  • It accepts text-only normalized transcript items, not HTML, scripts, archives, attachments, or server-fetched URLs.
  • The official skill removes raw tool results, reasoning, prompts, local paths, credentials, cookies, and auth material before upload.
  • The receiver still treats every transcript as untrusted text. Copying a beamed transcript into a new agent session is a separate operator action.
  • Requests are rate-limited and concurrency-limited before the body is read.

Mirroring

Beam can also act as the sender: an opt-in mirror that continuously publishes this machine’s active local coding sessions (Claude Code, Codex, and other registered session catalogs) to a remote Beam receiver, such as a shared team Gateway. Teammates then watch near-live session transcripts in the remote Control UI without any access to the source machine.
  • endpoint (required): the remote receiver URL. HTTPS is enforced for non-loopback hosts; plaintext http:// is accepted only for localhost/127.0.0.1/::1 development.
  • token: Gateway credential for the remote receiver, sent as Authorization: Bearer. Accepts a plain string or a secret reference; a configured-but-unresolved token pauses mirroring instead of sending unauthenticated requests. Deployments fronted by an identity-aware proxy need an ingress that accepts this bearer credential.
  • catalogs (required): the session catalog ids to mirror, as explicit per-catalog consent — an omitted or empty list mirrors nothing. The local beam receiver catalog is always excluded so two mirrored Gateways cannot re-mirror each other’s rows.
  • pollSeconds (default 30, minimum 10): how often the mirror scans local catalogs.
  • activeWindowMinutes (default 180): sessions with newer activity than this window count as live and stay mirrored; when a session goes idle past the window the mirror sends one final completed update.
The mirror applies the same redaction contract as the beam skill before anything leaves the machine: only user and agent message text is uploaded, while reasoning, tool calls, tool results, and raw payloads are replaced with compact counts. Snapshots are capped to the receiver limits (200 items, 56 KiB), dropping oldest entries first and marking the upload truncated. Sessions on paired nodes are not mirrored; the mirror shares only sessions from this Gateway’s machine, newest 32 first.

Troubleshooting

404 Not Found : The Beam plugin is disabled, the Gateway has not restarted since enablement, or the request is reaching another Gateway. 401 Unauthorized : The request did not satisfy Gateway HTTP auth. Check the bearer credential or trusted-proxy/Access session. 405 Method Not Allowed : The receiver accepts only POST. 413 Payload Too Large : The serialized request exceeded 56 KiB. The official skill drops older sanitized messages until the snapshot fits. 429 Too Many Requests : The authenticated client exceeded the bounded request or concurrency limit. Retry after the current minute window.